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Through the evaluation of the impact of corporate governance theories on Portuguese 
Listed Companies and its development on Portugal, this dissertation helps to 
understand how does performance in Portuguese listed companies relates to 
Corporate Governance variables. This study, is based on a sample of 38 Portuguese 
firms, during the period of 2005 to 2012. The main conclusions are the higher levels of 
board independence that evidenced higher levels of performance, and the CEO and 
Chairman role duality showed benefits on companies' performance. Also, the Latin 
model systems have been losing observations to the Anglo-Saxon model, additionally, 
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The corporate governance definition most widely used is the definition given by the 
committee named after its chairman, Sir Adrian Cadbury, the UK's Cadbury Committee on 
Corporate Governance, in its report “Code of Best Practices” submitted in December 1992. 
The committee described corporate governance as, "the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled" (Commitee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
1992, p.14). The issues regarding the governance of corporations had been mentioned 
since the first economic theories, as Adam Smith (1776), or Berle & Means (1932). With 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) they gain particularly visibility,  but it was since Cadbury’s report 
that the concept of "Corporate Governance" has increased its relevance. 
Nowadays and at an international level, Corporate Governance has been an increasingly 
controversial subject whether for theorists, politicians or companies. In the wake of the 
recent management and financial scandals in corporations around the world, as the Enron 
collapse or WorldCom, Vivendi and Parmalat scandals, Corporate Governance increased 
its importance and was recognized as being the core in understanding the way 
organizations are run. The occurrence of financial scandals was not different for Portugal, 
where for instance we had the BPN (Banco Português de Negócios) case, that lead the 
financial institution to nationalization and the former directors accused of financial crimes. 
Or the scandal in BCP (Banco Comercial Português) that carried a collective dismissal of 
part of the financial institution board of directors, and accused of financial crimes by the 
new board members. These events bring up questions such as the ones stated by Clarke 
(2004), p.1: “how to ensure the power of organization is harnessed for the agreed purpose, 
rather than diverted to some other purpose”. With the obvious need to combat fraud and 
facilitate the access to capital markets, questions like these increase the importance of 
searching for new paradigms on Corporate Governance. 
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Laying on the Portuguese listed companies’ database, the research question of this thesis 
is, how does performance in Portuguese listed companies relates to Corporate 
Governance variables? According to the law, there is not one single Corporate Governance 
model applied by Portuguese companies. Among the 38 companies, from PSI Geral, 
considered for the empirical research, in the last year, 28 companies apply the Latin 
Model, 9 companies applied the Anglo-Saxon Model and 1 company were in a Germanic 
Model. Obviously the Latin Model outstands in the Portuguese companies, but can we say 
that it is the most efficient model? Does the board composition impact the company’s 
performance? How does the level of participation of different stakeholders on decision 
making influence the firm’s wealth? 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters: the introduction, the literature review, the 
methodology and sample description, the research results and findings and the 
conclusion. The main body starts in the second chapter with the Literature Review, which 
summarizes the relevant prior research that will serve as an overview of Corporate 
Governance main concepts, models, theories and studies concerning its relationship to 
performance. Also, is presented a brief corporate governance legal framework, since its 
worldwide emergence and its replication to Portugal, where is included the summary of 
the main actual legal codes, regulations and recommendations which concern the 
Portuguese Companies. This is followed by the methodology and sample description, 
chapter three, which mainly comprises the description of the statistical model that 
supports the empirical research. There is described the dependent and independent 
variables, the hypothesis to test in the model, as well as its key assumptions and 
limitations. In the end of the chapter, the sample is described in detail. The fourth section, 
the Research Results and Findings, presents and analyzes the results of the econometric 
model regarding the dependent and independent variables. Finally, the conclusion, part 
five, highlights the main conclusions of the research. Plus it mentions the importance and 
contributions of the research, as well as some recommendations for future research. All 
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important appendices indicated throughout appear at the end of the document, after the 
references listing. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Corporate Governance Concept and Definitions 
The definition of corporate governance most widely used is the definition given by the 
committee named after its chairman, Sir Adrian Cadbury, the UK's Cadbury Committee on 
Corporate Governance, in its report “Code of Best Practices” submitted in December 1992. 
The committee described corporate governance as, "the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled" (Commitee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
1992, p.14). 
But later OECD provided a wider definition for Corporate Governance concept in their 
“Principles of Corporate Governance”: 
 “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.” 
 In OECD Principles of Corporate Governance(2004), p.11 
2.2 Corporate Governance Main Theories 
Regarding corporate governance theories, historically, we can go back to the eighteenth 
century, and state the book published by the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam 
Smith, called "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations", when 
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referring to joint-stock companies (companies owned by multiple shareholders without 
limits to ownership, each one owning the portion of the company, including its profits or 
losses, and the ability to transfer their own shares to other shareholders), Adam Smith 
mentioned the main corporate governance issue: 
"The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own."  
In Smith (1776), p.606-607 
Proceeding with more contemporaneous perspectives, the most commonly known and 
studied corporate governance theory is the agency theory. It arose with Berle & Means 
(1932) from the debate on the separation of ownership and control of wealth, present in 
the concept of modern corporations, where despite the capital owners would prefer to 
manage their own companies, the capital requirements of modern economies, led to 
multiple owners, each one intending to maximize their own wealth, and thus the need of 
contracting agents with the responsibility of maximizing all shareholders' utility. Despite 
having influenced legal and economic theory in the United States law, there were some 
controversy between the neoclassical researchers, so this article was reviewed in 1965, by 
Berle, in some kind of a debate with an early article published by Peterson, in the same 
year, with the aim of defending the concept of the modern corporation, against Peterson's 
more classical economic view of the corporation. Berle (1965) points out some 
measurable facts as the size and scope of large corporate activities, the distribution of 
ownership, the change from wealth-holding to stock-holding, and the source of power 
over the capital, in order to prove that the trends identified on "The Modern Corporation 
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and Private Property" are  becoming real as "Most "owners" own stock, insurance savings 
and pension claims and the like, and do not manage; most managers do not own" (Clarke, 
2004, p.4). 
The agency theory gained particular relevance with the concept of firm presented by 
Jensen & Meckling (1976). Jensen & Meckling started by introducing a new definition for 
the firm, as a nexus of contracts among individual factors of production in opposition to 
the classical view of the firm as a single product entity with a commitment to the 
maximization of the profits (Clarke, 2004). Plus they characterized the firm by the 
existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization.  
But the main topic of their working paper is the agency relationship that is defined as: 
 “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are 
utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in 
the best interests of the principal.” 
In Jensen & Meckling (1976), p.5  
They describe agency costs as the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. 
The big agency problem refers to the separation of management and finance, based on 
the previous mentioned agency conflicts and deriving from the theory on property rights 
and finance theory, thus Jensen & Meckling developed a theory of the ownership 
structure of the firm. They referred to the “ownership structure” rather to the “capital 
structure” because they want to refer not only to the capital separation between debt and 
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equity, but also the division of equity between the fraction held by managers (“inside 
equity”) and the fraction held by anyone outside the firm (“outside equity”). 
Later Fama & Jensen (1983) continued the debate on the topic, focusing on the main 
problem of determining when the separation of the three main functions of corporate 
agents, the decision making, the decision control and the residual risk bearing, it's better 
than combining the three functions on the same agent. They argued that separation of 
“ownership” and “control” benefits from the specialization of management and risk 
bearing, and also on an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency 
problems, on open corporations, large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and 
nonprofit organizations. They concluded that it is efficient to combine decision 
management and control functions by restricting residual claims to decision makers, and 
it's effective for proprietorships, small partnerships and closed corporations. 
In order to bring together the interests of managers and shareholders, during the years 
theorists proposed a wide diversity of internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. For instance, starting with Fama (1980) that indicated efficient capital and 
labor markets, that act as an external mechanism of the market for corporate control. Or, 
Fama & Jensen (1983) that presented the importance of board of directors, in ensuring 
the monitoring of top executives. Some theorists propose some more controversial 
practices such as golden parachutes (Jensen, 1984). 
Despite some critics to agency theory as stated by Learmount (2002) like the tendency to 
see the firm only in contractual terms, the assumption of the utility-maximizing self-
interested human behavior, and the tendency to pursuit the protection of shareholder's 
capital as the "corporate governance problem", there are some theorists that emphasize 
the relevance of agency theory, as Eisenhardt (1989) in her assessment and review of 
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agency theory stresses out that the theory offers an important understanding of 
information asymmetries, risk bearing, corporate control and incentives in organizations. 
She also points out the similarity of agency theory with political models, as both assume a 
self-interested behavior of a pursuit of individual goals that conduct to organizational 
conflicts, or Daily, Dalton, & Cannella (2003) that underline the simplicity of the theory, 
that reduces the corporation to two participants managers and shareholders, who are 
self-interested humans, unwilling to sacrifice personal interest in the behalf of the 
corporation. 
In opposition to the agency theory, Donaldson & Davis (1991), developed the stewardship 
theory, with its roots on psychological and sociological theories. They contested the 
assumption of a self-interested manager, with the intention of maximizing his own 
economic gains, with the theory of a steward manager. This steward manager will behave 
in a collectivist way, by understanding that the individualistic behavior will bring a lower 
utility than the pursuit of the organizational goals. By doing so, the steward will protect 
and maximize shareholders wealth, and thus his own utility functions will be maximized. 
With this view, the steward should have an extended authority, in order to maximize the 
benefits of having steward director, because the steward can be trusted. Thus, the 
amount of monitoring and bonding costs will be diminished, since the steward will be 
motivated to act towards the organization objectives. In a corporate structure, this means 
that the CEOs, who are stewards, will also chair the board of directors. Later Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) made a comparison of agency theory and stewardship 
theory, based on the psychological and situational factors. In the psychological level they 
characterized stewards by reacting to intrinsic rewards, such as growth, achievement, 
affiliation and self-actualization, with a high value commitment with the corporation and a 
personal power, achieved by expertise and reference power. While agents react to 
extrinsic rewards like tangible or exchangeable commodities with a measurable value, 
MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
                                         PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE                                            8 
8 
 
externalize organizational results, in order to avoid the blame, with an institutional power, 
attributed by its position on the company. By the situational factors, they position 
stewards with a long term commitment, oriented to the company's performance, and a 
collectivist thinking. Contrary to agents who are identified with a control orientation, with 
the aim of controlling cost, that has a short term commitment and an individualistic way 
of thinking. Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) conclude that the choice between 
agency and stewardship relations between managers and shareholders depends on the 
assessment of the motivations of each other. So managers choose to behave as stewards 
or agents. If the shareholder chooses the opposite relationship, the part choosing the 
agency relationship is opportunistic, and the part choosing the steward relationship is 
betrayed. But when both managers and shareholders choose the agency relationship, the 
costs of the firm will tend to be minimized, and if they both choose a stewardship relation, 
the potential performance of the company will tend to be maximized.  
Another very important theory is the stakeholder theory, which despite its long history 
has had a lower impact on corporate governance policies, regarding agency theory. It was 
introduced by Freeman & Reed (1983), who define organizations as multilateral 
agreements between the enterprise and the stakeholders. They state that internal 
stakeholders (as employers, managers or owners), as well as external stakeholders (as 
customers, suppliers or competitors), interact with the company through formal and 
informal rules, while the governments and local communities engage with the company 
using formal and legal rules. As Blair (1996) concluded, if the aim of the corporation is to 
maximize the total wealth created by the company, rather than just the value added to 
the shareholders, the managers should concern with all the stakeholders. Clarke (1998) 
draws attention to the fact that this type of concept of the firms, and the ideology of  
"corporate citizenship - an organization with the mature appreciation of its rights and 
responsibilities" (Clarke, 2004, p.11) - is most commonly seen in European and Asian 
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business values, than in the Anglo-Saxon economies behaviors. But despite not being 
commonly seen on Anglo-Saxon countries, the pursuit of shareholder value, was specially 
criticized during the 1990's, when a fast increase of importance of the capital markets was 
verified. So, the debate arose in UK, and led to the publication of the "Review of Modern 
Company Law" (DTI, 2000), where it is concluded that boards of directors should pursue 
an "enlightened shareholder value", by equilibrating the interests of shareholders with the 
interests of other stakeholders. This publication led to changes in UK law, that reflected 
the principles already assumed in company law within the other European countries. 
Following the idea of the need of pursuing all stakeholders interest, and although the 
importance given by the agency theory to the board of directors, was very criticized, for 
instance by authors like Mace (1971), that argued that the power of board of directors is 
overcome by the power of successful CEO's, there are authors as Lawrence & Lorsch 
(1967), Pfeffer (1972), or Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold (2000), who seem to design a very  
important task to the board of directors, as being a link that connects the company to its 
external forces. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Models Around the World  
In order to acknowledge the different Corporate Governance models, I relied on the 
“Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance” proposed by Weimer & Pape (1999). 
They focused on the debate of the lack of coherent framework on Corporate Governance 
in an international context and proposed four types of systems, the Anglo-Saxon systems, 
the Germanic systems, the Latin systems and the Japanese system, that they define 
according to eight characteristics. They describe the Anglo-Saxon model, with the principle 
of "one share, one vote", based on the pursuit of shareholder value, and that is 
characterized by a one-tier board that includes both executive and non executive 
directors, both appointed and dismissed by shareholders. In Anglo-Saxon countries, stock 
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markets play an important role, in discipline managers, by allowing control to be 
transferred from inefficient to efficient management teams, so there are short-term 
economic relationships, and market flexibility, where the interest of managers and 
shareholders are align by the use of stock option plans. As for the Germanic model, it is 
based on the principle of the firm as an autonomous economic entity that is constituted 
by a diversity of stakeholders, and it is characterized by a two-tier board, split into the 
Management Board and the Supervisory Board, where shareholders appoint and dismiss 
the second one, and the second one appoints and dismisses the first one. In Germanic 
countries, the different stakeholders, as relevant shareholders, employees and industrial 
banks, play an important role, and the mutual-cross shareholdings are a mechanism for 
corporate control. There is a high ownership concentration and the economic 
relationships are stable and for a long period. Finally, the Latin model, since it is the last 
one that is used in the European countries, and consequently with interest for this 
research, this model has a mixed view of the firm, between the instrumental and 
institutional views. It can be a two-tier or one-tier system, and it's not common to 
distinguish between executives and non executives, so the power, is highly concentrated 
on the presidents figure. All the different stakeholders have an important role, but the 
main ones are the largest shareholders, as for firms, governments, financial holdings or 
cross-shareholdings. The corporate control is mainly imposed by laws and regulations, and 
it is based on long-term economic relationships. In the end, they concluded that there are 
two different systems, the Market-oriented systems, where an active external market for 
corporate control is used by independent shareholders to influence managerial decision-
making, and the Network-oriented systems, where oligarchy groups sway managerial 
decision-making, by stable relationships. 
Nevertheless the existence of such diversified corporate governance models there is a 
stream that defend a theory of convergence of corporate governance models towards the 
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Anglo-Saxon model. Like Nestor & Thompson (2000), argues that the globalization 
pressures, rose the need for firms to adapt their governance models. This convergence 
can be attributed to globalization of market capitals, new financial instruments, deeper 
integration of markets, international competition or the rapid emergence of new financial 
intermediaries. 
2.4 History of Corporate Governance Legal Framework: Worldwide emergence 
and its replication to Portugal 
The main legal events concerning Corporate Governance history, gathered from Costa & 
Santos (2011) and Santos (2009), go back to 1987 with the Treadway Report. This report 
comes from a committee lead by James C. Treadway Jr, that incorporated people from 
several American institutions and organizations concerned with Financial and Accounting 
matters. In their report they proposed 11 recommendations for the Audit Boards, which 
were the committees that supported the corporate governance financial matters in 
American companies. 
Later and although it appeared after two reports on the USA, the Cadbury Report (1992), 
came as a world reference on Corporate Governance. It emerged after the British financial 
scandals. The Committee on Financial Aspects on Corporate Governance, lead by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, focused on the composition of Audit Boards, the responsibilities 
concerning the external auditors and board of directors, and the disclosure of financial 
information. 
After the Asian crisis in 1997/1998, in 1999 the OECD published the “Principles of 
Corporate Governance”, one of the most influential guidelines that were revised in 2004. 
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In 2002, in response to the financial scandals of American companies (as Enron, 
WorldCom, and so on...) appeared the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a very strict regulation that 
imposed several rules concerning audit and security mechanisms, in order to ensure 
transparency and avoid frauds. 
In what concerns Portugal, and once again referring to the work of Costa & Santos (2011) 
and Santos (2009), as well as the relevant work of Silva et al. (2006), under the title of 
"Livro Branco sobre Corporate Governance em Portugal", the first legislation concerning 
corporate governance matters, even if not called by the name "Corporate Governance", 
appear in 1986 with the introduction of Código das Sociedades Comerciais, that contained 
the basic rules on corporate management and control for all types of corporations. This 
code has been revised several times since 1986, and the last update, at the time of writing 
is dated from 2011. Referring to Código das Sociedades Comerciais, one of the most 
relevant topic concerning Corporate Governance, comes from the 2006 revision of the 
code (Batista & Farinha, 2009), where the Portuguese legislation, without seeking to 
impose strict or uniform models, incorporated, by law, three different governance models. 
As stated in Article 278º, of Código das Sociedades Comerciais (Appendix 2), companies 
can choose between: 
 Latin Model (Ordinary System) - with a board of directors and a supervisory board, that 
might be just one manager or a sole inspector; 
 Empowered Latin Model - equal to the Latin Model, but where there is an external 
statutory auditor, that, according to law, is mandatory for some companies; 
 Anglo-Saxon Model (One-Tier System) - with a board of directors, that must include an 
audit committee and a statutory auditor; 
 Germanic Model (Two-Tier System) - with an executive board of directors, a general 
and supervisory board and a statutory auditor; 
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 Empowered Germanic Model - equal to the Germanic Model, but with the existence 
on the general and supervisory board, of a committee for financial matters, that for 
some companies, according to law, is mandatory. 
These models are illustrated on Appendix 4. 
But the first legal approach to Corporate Governance, as so-called, was in 1999, with the 
introduction by CMVM of "Recommendations on Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies". Following the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, these 
recommendations, again, without imposing strict and uniform models, mentioned topics 
such as disclosure of information, exercise of voting rights, shareholder representation, 
institutional investors, corporate rules and structure, and functions of administration 
boards. 
Afterwards in 2001, the "Recommendations on Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies" were revised and followed by a CMVM Regulation, achieving the form of 
duties, even if only for listed companies, the regulations concerned information disclosure 
on Corporate Governance practices. Despite of the formal character of CMVM regulations, 
as no strict models were imposed, the only obligation adopted was the "comply or 
explain". Imported from the Cadbury Report, the concept of "comply or explain" means 
companies are obliged to report whether or not they adopted the recommendation, and if 
not adopted, or even if partially adopted, companies have the obligation to explain the 
reason of not following the recommendation, or why it doesn't apply to the business 
model of the company. The CMVM's recommendations and regulations were revised in 
2003, 2005, 2007 and finally in 2010, in order to keep up to date the adaptability of the 
recommendations. Meanwhile, in 2006, the Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance 
published the "Livro Branco Sobre Corporate Governance em Portugal" (Silva et al., 2006), 
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with the intention of summarizing the development of Corporate Governance in Portugal, 
as well as to add some comments and reflections, in order to act like a guide of best 
practices. But, recalling to the code in force to the date of this research, the CMVM 
Corporate Governance Code (2010), the main topics covered by the recommendations are: 
 the General Meetings - mentioning aspects such as the disclosure of  the remuneration 
of the president of the General Meeting Board, the participation in the meetings, and 
the exercise of voting rights; 
 the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board - establishing advices regarding the 
board's structure, duties, eligibility, remuneration, and mainly it's mentioned the 
concept of the independent director (for independency, one should refer to Article 
414.º, n.º 5, of "Código das Sociedades Comerciais" - Appendix 3); 
 the Information and Auditing - pointing out the general disclosure duties, and the 
external auditor duties; 
 the Conflict of Interests - citing the deals that are carried out by the qualifying 
shareholders of the company. 
Based on the same presupposition of flexibility and adaptability of the Corporate 
Governance Code, in January of 2013 was published, in Portugal, a new Corporate 
Governance Code, but now under the responsibility of the Portuguese Institute of 
Corporate Governance. Keeping the concept of "comply or explain", with the aim of being 
more flexible than the previous ones, this code is intended to be a code of best practices, 
not only to listed companies, but to all commercial companies, based on civil law. The new 
code is to be applied since the 1st January of 2014, but despite being the most updated 
code in Portugal, this research will focus on the previous codes, since up to the date of the 
research the last code in force was the 2010 Corporate Governance Code (and 
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respectively the CMVM Regulation No 1/2010). For the summary of Portuguese Corporate 
Governance Codes turn to Appendix 5. 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Performance 
After Berle & Means (1932) economists have questioned what are the costs of spread 
share-capital, and consequently the impact of its ownership structure on capital. Later 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) based  their theory of separation of ownership and control on 
the assumption of the dispersion of capital through multiple shareholders. They defined 
agency costs as the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding 
expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. After all obligations, the profit is the 
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the firm, that act as a compensation for 
shareholders risk bearing functions. Since the agency theory, researchers have studied the 
impact on firm performance of different corporate governance measures, mainly topics on 
boards’ composition, or the capital structure. 
Following Jensen & Meckling (1976) assumption of the dispersion of capital through 
multiple shareholders, Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) and Guedri & 
Hollandts (2008) found negative effects of ownership concentration on performance 
measures (as measures of performance Stock Market Return, Return on Equity, Tobin's Q 
or Return on Invested Capital). Contradictory, Guedri & Hollandts (2008) found a positive 
relation of ownership concentration with market to book ratio. 
Proceeding, several choices are made for corporate governance structures, in order to 
assure that shareholders interests are being followed by managerial decision-making, 
which could impact firm performance.  
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For instance Fama & Jensen (1983) stated that a higher board independence (or 
percentage of board outsiders) is expected to represent a better active monitoring of the 
board insiders decisions. Starting with Baysinger & Butler (1985) regarding independent 
directors, they found that firms with a higher percentage of independent directors 
presented a higher performance. Later Hermanlin & Weisbach (1991) concluded that no 
relationship exists between board composition and performance (using Tobin’s Q as the 
performance measure). Such a conclusion was corroborated by Hermalin & Weisbach 
(2001), who denote that several empirical studies on the past years on board composition 
also didn't verify any relation to corporate performance. Then Yermack (1996) and 
Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), observed a negative relation between the increase of the 
percentage of outside directors and firm performance (also measured by Tobin's Q). 
Bhagat & Black (1998) and  Bhagat & Bolton (2008) found a negative relationship between 
board independence and operating performance. Finally Bhagat & Bolton (2009), found 
opposite evidences concerning the period prior to 2002 and after 2002 (considering 2002 
the year of implementing SOX Act). They document that before 2002 there is a negative 
relationship between board independence and operating performance, and after 2002 
there is a positive relationship between independence and operating performance.  
Also a relevant topic approached by several studies is the separation or duality of CEO and 
chairman roles. Donaldson & Davis (1991) concluded for higher shareholder returns (in 
terms of ROE) in the presence of CEO Duality. Yermack (1996) showed that firms are more 
valuable (in terms of Tobin's Q), when the CEO and board Chairman positions are 
separated. Davis et al. (1997) stated that the steward relationship will tend to diminish the 
monitoring and bonding costs, as well as to improve the long-term performance of the 
firm. Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) identified a negative relation of CEO-Duality with 
operating performance, but they didn't establish any relation regarding stock market 
based measures. 
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Other important point of discussion is the board ownership, Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny 
(1988), concluded that Tobin's Q rises when the board ownership rises up to 5%, then it 
falls when the board ownership keeps rising up to 25%, and finally it increases but with a 
slower rhythm if board ownership rises beyond 25%. Later Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) and 
Yermack (1996) found a positive related performance of the firms, in terms of Tobin's Q, in 
regard to increasing on inside ownership. Also Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) found a 
positive relation between Director Ownership and operating performance (as measured 
by ROA). 
"Financial performance measures indicate whether the company’s strategy, 
implementation, and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement (...) 
Survival was measured by cash flow, success by quarterly sales growth and 
operating income by division, and prosperity by increased market share by 
segment and return on equity."  
In  Kaplan & Norton (1992), p. 8 
The above mentioned authors used a diverse variety of performance measures, and for 
this research we considered three types of them, the financial performance, the 
operational performance and the market based performance. As Baysinger & Butler 
(1985) denoted the most commonly used measure of performance as ROE (Return on 
Equity), according to Morck et al. (1988), Hermanlin & Weisbach (1991), Yermack (1996), 
and  Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) the most consensual market based performance measure 
is Tobins'Q and finally following Bhagat & Bolton (2008) they report as operating 
performance measure ROA (Return on Assets). 
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3. Research Methodology and Sample Description 
3.1 Research Hypothesis 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the effect of the corporate governance determinant 
variables on the companies' performance.  Proceeding, based on the main corporate 
governance studies analyzed, concerning the chosen determinant variables (Appendix 6), 
the hypotheses to test are going to be described. 
Referring to the Portuguese law, according to article 278º of Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais (2011), as previously explained in chapter 2.4, three different corporate 
governance models are provided by law. Following the taxonomy given by Weimer & Pape 
(1999), in this dissertation they were denominated as the Latin model, the Anglo-Saxon 
model and the Germanic model. Although there is not a compulsory governance model, in 
2012, the last analyzed year, the sample accounted for 28 companies (74% of the sample) 
structured as the Latin model, 9 following the Anglo-Saxon model and only 1 representing 
the Germanic model (Table III). Giving the high observation of the Latin model, and 
considering small observation of the Germanic model in the sample, the first hypothesis to 
test is: 
Hypothesis 1: Performance (considering ROE, ROA and Tobin's Q measures) is positively 
related to  firms who present the Latin Model, rather than the Anglo-Saxon Model. 
As explained in chapter 2.5 of this dissertation, several authors addressed on the topic of 
board independence. Although Bhagat & Black (1998) and  Bhagat & Bolton (2008) found 
a negative relationship between board independence and performance. Later Bhagat & 
Bolton (2009), found opposite evidences concerning the period prior to 2002 and after  
2002 (considering 2002 the year of implementing SOX Act). They document that before 
2002 there is a negative relationship between board independence and performance and 
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after 2002 there is a positive relationship between independence and performance. Since 
this research is based on the period of 2005-2012, after the implementation of SOX, 
following a more current approach, the second hypothesis to test is: 
Hypothesis 2.A: Financial Performance (measured by ROE) and operating performance 
(measured by ROA) is positively related to Board Independence. 
Further following Yermack (1996) and Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), observation of a 
negative relation between the increase of the percentage of outside directors and firm 
performance (also measured by Tobin's Q), an alternative hypothesis to test is: 
Hypothesis 2.B: Market based performance (measured by Tobin's Q) negatively relates to 
Board Independence. 
As previously explained in point 2.5 of this thesis, several studies have examined the 
separation or duality of CEO and chairman roles. In conformity with Yermack (1996) that 
showed that firms are more valuable (in terms of Tobin's Q), when the CEO and board 
Chairman positions are separated. And, additionally considering Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009) identification of a negative relation of CEO-Duality with operating performance, the 
third hypothesis to test is: 
Hypothesis 3: Operational and market based performance (measured by ROA and Tobin's Q, 
respectively) has a negative impact in the presence of CEO/Chairman Duality. 
Regarding the type of controlling shareholder, both studies by La Porta, Silanes, & Shleifer 
(1999) and Faccio & Lang (2002) analyzed the distribution of ownership for each type of 
influent shareholder, and concluded that except in economies with very good shareholder 
protection, relatively few of the firms are widely held, mainly in Europe, despite UK and 
Ireland where the widely held corporations have an important impact, the majority of 
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European corporations is either controlled by families or by the State. Statistically, this is 
also verified in Portugal, where for example considering the analyzed sample in 2012, 25 
companies are controlled by families, this amount represents approximately 66% of the 
sample (Table IV). Given the high observation of family controlled companies, the fourth 
hypothesis to test is: 
Hypothesis 4: Performance (considering ROE, ROA and Tobin's Q measures) has a positive 
impact when the company is Family controlled. 
In the debate of board ownership, following Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny (1988), Agrawal & 
Knoeber (1996) and Yermack (1996) that found a positive relation to the performance of 
the firms, in terms of Tobin's Q, in regard to increasing on inside ownership, as mentioned 
on chapter 2.5. The fifth hypothesis to test is: 
Hypothesis 5.A: Market Based Performance (measured by Tobins' Q) is positively related to 
Director Ownership. 
 Also following Bhagat & Boltogn (2008, 2009) that found a positive relation between 
Director Ownership and performance, an alternative hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5.B: Financial performance (measured by ROE) and operational performance 
(measured by ROA) is positively related to Director Ownership. 
In terms of the dispersion of capital through multiple shareholders, according to Demsetz 
& Lehn (1985), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) and Guedri & Hollandts (2008) who found 
negative effects of ownership concentration on performance measures (as measures of 
performance Stock Market Return, Return on Equity, Tobin's Q or Return on Invested 
Capital), the sixth hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 6: Financial and market based performance (measured by ROE and Tobin's Q, 
respectively) have negative effects when Shareholder concentration increases. 
Table I summarizes the expected effects, under the hypothesis considered for this 
research. 
 
3.2 Research Methodology and the Statistical Model 
The statistical model analyzed throughout this research is based on the corporate 
governance theories previously analysed. As presented on appendix 1, regarding to each 
theory, were identified some main points or possible determinant variables to consider in 
the research. Within the possible variables listed on appendix 1, the variables that were 
not possible to gather information for my sample choice were disregarded, as the ones 
that weren´t applied in Portuguese companies, or the ones that weren't significant for the 
Portuguese sample. Finally, the main corporate governance variables that could apply to 
the Portuguese sample were gathered on appendix 6 through a meta-analysis method, in 
order to define the hypothesis to test. This meta-analysis method is focused on combining 
results from different studies in order to identify patterns, or points of disagreement 
Table I - Summary Research Hypothesis












Latin Model + + +
Board Independence + + -
CEO/Chairman Duality N/A - -
Family Controled Company + + +
Director Ownership + + +
Shareholder Concentration - N/A -
Subtitle
+ - Performance measure presents a positive relation to Corporate Governance Determinant
- - Performance measure presents a negative relation to Corporate Governance Determinant
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among authors. Therefore, the corporate governance variables that are going to be 
discussed further are the Latin Model, the Board Independence, the CEO/Chairman Dual 
Role, the Family Controlled Company, the Director Ownership and finally the Shareholder 
Concentration. Also three control variables, as the Economic Period, the Sales, and the 
Book Debt to Equity, were considered to control for other effects on the corporate 
environment. Through this analysis, three different performance variables were chosen, 
the ROE, the ROA and Tobin's Q, as the ones that were widely used by the corporate 
governance researchers on their studies. For the summary of included variables refer to 
appendix 7. 
After defining the variables composing the regression, the big concern was regarding the 
common statistical problems. Regarding multicollinearity, the statistical phenomenon in 
which two or more explanatory variables are highly correlated, in order to prevent it, 
some variables that measured similar factors were previously dropped. Since this research 
is based on microeconomic data, another one of the common problems is the existence of 
endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated with the 
error term in a regression model, and it may arise from measurement errors, 
autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity or omitted variables. Some 
advantages of a panel data analysis pointed out by Hsiao (2007) are controlling the impact 
of omitted variables and the ability to make different transformations to induce different 
and deductible changes in the estimators. Therefore panel data was the preferred method 
to compute the database, plus in order to control for some possible endogeneity, 
according to Wooldridge (2003), an Hausman Test was applied, where the null hypothesis 
is that the preferred model is random effects versus the alternative model, the fixed 
effects. Through this test, in appendix 8, we do not reject H0, and although we can assume 
that the Fixed Effect is not correlated with any of the regressors, givin that we are 
considering microeconomic data, the use of Fixed Effects is going to be prefered in order 
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REASON FOR EXCLUDING CONSOLIDATING COMPANY
1 ALTRI SGPS ALTRI, SGPS, SA
2 B.COM.PORTUGUES FINANCIAL COMPANY
3 B.ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL COMPANY
4 BANCO BPI FINANCIAL COMPANY
5 BANCO POP.ESPANOL FINANCIAL COMPANY
6 BANCO SANTANDER FINANCIAL COMPANY
7 BANIF SA FINANCIAL COMPANY
8 BENFICA SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
9 BRISA BRISA,SA
10 CIMPOR,SGPS CIMPOR, SGPS, SA
11 COFINA,SGPS COFINA, SGPS, SA
12 COMPTA
COMPTA - EQUIPAMENTOS E SERVIÇOS DE 
INFORMÁTICA, SA
13 CORTICEIRA AMORIM CORTICEIRA AMORIM, SGPS, SA
14 E.SANTO FIN.NOM FINANCIAL COMPANY
15 E.SANTO FINANCIAL FINANCIAL COMPANY / PREFERRED SHARES
16 EDP EDP – ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL, SA
17 EDP RENOVAVEIS EDP RENOVAVEIS, SA
18 ESTORIL SOL N
19 ESTORIL SOL P PREFERRED SHARES
20 F.RAMA F. RAMADA INVESTIMENTOS, SGPS, SA
21 FUT.CLUBE PORTO SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
22 GALP ENERGIA-NOM GALP ENERGIA, SGPS, SA
23 GLINTT
PARAREDE - TECNOLOGIAS DE INFORMAÇÃO, SA / GLINT - 
GLOBAL INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES, SA
24 IBERSOL,SGPS IBERSOL, SGPS, SA
25 IMOB.C GRAO PARA IMOBILIÁRIA CONSTRUTORA GRÃO PARÁ, SA
26 IMPRESA,SGPS IMPRESA, SGPS, SA
27 INAPA-INV.P.GESTAO
28 INAPA-PREF S/ VOTO PREFERRED SHARES
29 J.MARTINS,SGPS JERÓNIMO MARTINS, SGPS, SA
30 LISGRAFICA LISGRÁFICA – IMPRESSÃO E ARTES GRÁFICAS, SA
31 MARTIFER MARTIFER, SGPS, SA
32 MEDIA CAPITAL GRUPO MEDIA CAPITAL, SGPS, SA
33 MOTA ENGIL MOTA ENGIL, SGPS, SA
34 NOVABASE,SGPS NOVABASE, SGPS, SA
35 OREY ANTUNES ESC. SOCIEDADE COMERCIAL OREY ANTUNES, SA
36 P.TELECOM PORTUGAL TELECOM, SGPS, SA
37 PORTUCEL PORTUCEL, SA
38 REDITUS,SGPS REDITUS, SGPS, SA
39 REN REN - REDE ELÉCTRICA, SA
40 S.COSTA
41 S.COSTA-PREF PREFERRED SHARES
42 SAG GEST SAG GEST - SOLUÇÕES AUTOMÓVEIS GLOBAIS, SGPS, SA
43 SEMAPA
SEMAPA - SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTÃO, 
SGPS, SA
44 SONAE SONAE, SGPS, SA
45 SONAE CAPITAL FINANCIAL COMPANY
46 SONAE IND.SGPS SONAE INDÚSTRIA, SGPS, SA
47 SONAECOM,SGPS SONAECOM ,SGPS, SA
48 SPORTING SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
49 SUMOL+COMPAL SUMOL+COMPAL, SA
50 TEIXEIRA DUARTE TEIXEIRA DUARTE, SA
51 TOYOTA CAETANO TOYOTA CAETANO PORTUGAL, SA
52 VAA VISTA ALEGRE
53 VAA-V.ALEGRE-FUSAO
SHARES FROM THE IMPUGNMENT PROCESS REGARDING 
THE OPERATIONS OF SLIP AND MERGER
54 ZON MULTIMEDIA
ZON MULTIMÉDIA - SERVIÇOS DE TELECOMUNICAÇÕES E 
MULTIMÉDIA, SGPS, SA
COMPANY LISTING NAME
ESTORIL SOL, SGPS, SA
INAPA – INVESTIMENTOS, PARTICIPAÇÕES E GESTÃO, SA
GRUPO SOARES DA COSTA, SGPS, SA
VAA-VISTA ALEGRE ATLANTIS, SGPS, SA
to allow for possible correlation between the Fixed Effects and the regressor. According to 
Torres-Reyna in addition a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test was used in order to 
decide between a Random Effects estimator or a simple OLS (Appendix 8). In conclusion, 
the null hypothesis that there is not a significant difference across units was rejected, 
therefore the random effect is more appropriate than a simple OLS regression. Accounting 
for other possible common statistical error heteroskedasticity, when in a 
sequence of Yt given Xt, the conditional variance of Yt given Xt, changes with t, according to 
Wooldridge (2003), a White Test was executed, and all equations rejected the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity, therefore accounted for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (Appendix 8). Finally considering the Autocorrelation problem, when 
there is correlation between values of the process at different times, as defined by 
Wooldridge (2010), an Wooldridge Test was performed, and also rejected the null 
hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation, indicating the presence of autocorrelation 
(Appendix 8). In the end, based on Torres-Reyna, not forgetting the use of the Random 
Effects estimator, also to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the cluster 
effect was applied in STATA to perform the regressions: 
    
                                                          
                                                                             
                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                             (1)                                                                                                                                       
    
                                                           
                                                                             
                                       
(2)                                                                                                                                                    
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(3). 
3.3 Model Variables Description 
In order to measure performance, three different levels of performance were considered: 
the financial performance, the operational performance and the market based 
performance. Return on Equity (ROE), as stated by Damodaran (2007) is focused on just 
the equity component of the investment, relating the earnings left over for equity 
investors after the debt costs have been factored into the equity invested in the asset. It is 
calculated based on net income of the current year, considered to be generated by the 
equity invested at the beginning of the period. Return on Assets (ROA), following Barber 
& Lyon (1997),  Core, Guay, & Rusticus (2006) and Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009), was 
calculated as operating income after depreciation divided by year-end total assets, where 
operating income is defined as sales less cost of goods sold, and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses. Tobin's Q, the variable derived from q, that is the variable 
introduced by Tobin & Brainard (1968), as the ratio between the market value and 
replacement value of the same physical asset. As a proxy to q, Tobins' Q was measured at1 
the beginning of the fiscal year, according to Kaplan & Zingales (1997), Gompers, Ishii, & 
Metrick (2003) and Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) by the market value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets 
plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity 
and balance sheet deferred taxes. 
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To explain corporate governance, seven determinant variables were chosen, and 
described as following. Latin Model is the variable based on the Article 278.º, of Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais (2011), presented on appendix 2 and 4, and following the 
taxonomy given by Weimer & Pape (1999). It is defined as a dummy variable that assumes 
1 in the presence of Latin Model, and 0 in the presence of Anglo-saxon Model. Board 
Independence, as defined by Bhagat & Bolton (2009), p.12 " is measured as the 
percentage of directors who are unaffiliated with the sample firm. This includes directors 
who are neither employees of the firm nor affiliated with the firm." Regarding the 
Portuguese law, it refers to Article 414.º, n.º 5, of Código das Sociedades Comerciais 
(2011), in appendix 3. CEO/Chairman Dual Role, as defined by Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009), p.12, as a dummy variable, means "taking the value of 1 if the CEO of the sample 
firm is also the board chair, and 0 otherwise". In the case of the Family Controlled 
Company, as stated by Faccio & Lang (2002), contrary to ownership that is measured by 
cash-flow rights, control is measured by the voting rights held by the largest shareholder. 
According to La Porta et al. (1999), to describe control of companies, we should look for 
shareholders who control over 10 percent of the votes. Consistent with both studies this 
categorical variable will assume value of 1 if the company the company is controlled by a 
family, and 0 otherwise. Director Ownership, following Bhagat & Bolton (2009), p.12, is 
calculated as "the dollar value of common stock owned by the median director." 
Shareholder Concentration, consistent with Guedri & Hollandts (2008), p.9 , refers to "the 
total percentage of stock held by shareholders that owned at least 5 per cent of a firm’s 
stock".  
Also, in order to control for other firm specific effects, three control variables were added. 
As the Economic Period, controlling for the possible effects of the financial crisis dated to 
2008, it assumes value 1 if after 2008, and 0 otherwise. The Sales, to control for firm size 
effects, calculated as the net sales. Finally the Book Debt to Equity ratio, introduced to 
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control for leverage structure, relative to the proportion of shareholders' equity and debt 
used to finance a company's assets.  
3.4 Sample Description 
This empirical research has its focus on Portugal, and for this purpose, 38 companies listed 
on PSI Geral were observed. PSI Geral is composed by all shares listed on Euronext Lisbon, 
and the Index structure represents the general trends of underlying market, this 
representing the Portuguese Stock Exchange Market (Rules for the PSI Geral Index). The 
Portuguese benchmark index is PSI 20, which lies on the PSI Geral Index, and reflects the 
price evolution of the 20 largest companies listed on the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
(Rules for the PSI 20 Index). Only listed companies were considered for the empirical 
research, in order to ensure the availability of necessary data and respective accuracy. For 
statistical significance purposes the broadest Index was considered, so the 54 listings that 
compose the PSI Geral Index (at December 31st, 2012) were revised. From the 54 listings, 
for the companies with both common and preferred stock, preferred stock listings were 
disregarded in order to ensure the comparability between all the companies in analysis. 
So, starting with 51 different companies, football clubs were excluded, since, as Gómez, 
Martí, & Opazo (2008), p.3, put it: "football clubs can be considered as sport-providing 
entities, either at a recreational or professional level". In the past years, the increasing 
professionalization and commercialization of football clubs, players, brands and images 
lead to the growing view of a football clubs as a commercial companies, pressured to 
become joint stock sport companies (SAD - Sociedade Anónima Desportiva). These 
companies are listed on the Euronext stock exchange, but are very unique companies, 
according to Gómez, Martí, & Opazo (2008), they present a very high leverage ratio, give 
emphasis to short-term performance, their financial performance is dependent on the 
sports results and have very peculiar structures, where the communication area of the 
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company is the predominant one. Concluding, since these companies have such special 
characteristics, I excluded them from the analysis in order not to affect the comparability 
of the sample. A second exclusion, the financial companies, as stated by  Rajan & Zingales 
(1995), p.1424 financial companies' leverage “is strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) 
investor insurance schemes", plus their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable to 
the debt issued by nonfinancial firms.  Also, Fama & French (2002), p.8 argued that, 
“Excluding financials and utilities may also go a long way toward alleviating any omitted 
variable problems." Transposing from the listings to the reference companies, only the 
consolidating companies were considered, according to Niskanen et al. (1998), p.32 that 
refer, “Consolidated earnings are informative because they reflect the economic 
performance of the entire economic entity where investors hold their equity claims” 
(Appendix 9). In the end, 38 companies listed on PSI Geral between 2005 and 2012 
(Appendix 10) were considered on an unbalanced panel data. The data was gathered 
mainly from analysing consolidating companies’ annual reports, but other databases were 
considered, namely Reuters, CMVM reports and Euronext reports. As previously 
mentioned, all observations on the panel data refer to the period between 2005 and 2012. 
As denoted by Wooldridge (2003), for some applications, especially for small data sets, the 
OLS estimates are influenced by one or several observations, called outliers that are 
important to identify and reestimate regressions after outliers excluded. This way, after 
computing the minimum and maximum analysis to identify possible outliers, for the 
dependent variables, ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q, possible outliers were observed and 
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4. Research Results and Findings 
The main topic of this research are the empirical results, and consequently its main 
findings. Accounting for the descriptive statistics, representing the sample characteristics, 
please take in consideration the summary statistics presented on table II. 
 
In sum, the 293 observations of corporate governance variables refer to the number of 
periods, usually 8, except in the companies which weren't listed since 2005, times the 38 
companies under analysis. Regarding Performance variables, ROE varied between -0,25 
and 0,45, with a mean value of 0,10, as of ROA, varied between -0,6 and 0,15, and in 
average 0,05, finally Tobin's Q with a mean value of 1,10, varied within 0,44 and 1,99 
parameters. Board Independence approaches in average the CMVM recommendation of 
the 25% representation, with a mean of 22%. Director Ownership is quite variable among 
the analyzed companies, getting a minimum value of 0 € and a maximum value of 
123.000.000 €, has in average 3.242.758 €. For this sample, shareholder concentration is 
relatively high in average, with a 
mean of 68%.  
When  analyzing the type of 
Corporate Governance Model 
applied by Portuguese' Listed 
Table II - Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROE 256 0,0964 0,1307 -0,2453 0,4510
ROA 274 0,0471 0,0340 -0,0595 0,1455
TobinsQ 277 1,1044 0,2723 0,4440 1,9876
BoardIndependence 293 0,2157 0,1996 0,0000 0,7143
DirectorsOwnership 293 3.242.758 9.972.764 0,0000 123.000.000
ShareholderConcentration 293 0,6763 0,1776 0,0569 0,9974
BookDE 293 3,2472 14,7261 -134,4953 122,7966
NetSales 293 1.660.000.000 3.230.000.000 1.562.515 18.500.000.000
Summary Statistics
Table III - Corporate Governance Model of PSI General (2005-2012)
Year Total
2005 32 97% 1 3% 0 0 33
2006 32 94% 1 3% 1 3% 34
2007 30 83% 5 14% 1 3% 36
2008 28 74% 9 24% 1 3% 38
2009 28 74% 9 24% 1 3% 38
2010 28 74% 9 24% 1 3% 38
2011 28 74% 9 24% 1 3% 38
2012 28 74% 9 24% 1 3% 38
Total 234 80% 52 18% 7 2% 293
Anglo-Saxon Model Germanic Model
Corporate Governance Model of PSI General (2005-2012)
Latin Model
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Companies we can observe that only one company (EDP - according to appendix 10) 
applies the Germanic Model. Regarding the Anglo-Saxon Model it has been increasing its 
observation in Portugal, since in 2005 only 1 company applied it and in 2012, already 9 
companies of PSI Geral choose it. So 
we can conclude that the Latin Model, 
the historical model in Portugal, has 
been losing observations to the Anglo-
Saxon Model, which is in line with the 
conclusion of  Weimer & Pape (1999) 
of convergence of the corporate 
governance systems towards the Anglo-Saxon Model. Consider Table III and Graphic I.  
 
Regarding the type of controlling shareholder we corroborate La Porta et al. (1999) 
conclusion that in Europe, despite UK and Ireland where the widely held corporations 
have an important impact, the majority of European corporations is either controlled by 
families or by the State. Thought the results we verify that between 20 companies in 2005 
and 25 companies in 2012, the Family Controlled companies represent the majority of the 
listed companies in Portugal (rounding 60%), and even gain more impact in the last years.  
Additionally the non-financial institution controlled companies slightly increased its 
observations from representing 18% of the population to 24% (from 6 companies in 2005 
Table IV - Type of Controlling Shareholder of PSI General (2005-2012)
Year Total
2005 4 12% 20 61% 1 3% 6 18% 2 6% 33
2006 5 15% 20 59% 1 3% 6 18% 2 6% 34
2007 6 17% 21 58% 2 6% 6 17% 1 3% 36
2008 8 21% 21 55% 2 5% 7 18% 0 0% 38
2009 5 13% 23 61% 2 5% 8 21% 0 0% 38
2010 5 13% 24 63% 2 5% 7 18% 0 0% 38
2011 4 11% 24 63% 2 5% 8 21% 0 0% 38
2012 2 5% 25 66% 2 5% 9 24% 0 0% 38
Total 39 13% 178 61% 14 5% 57 19% 5 2% 293
Type of Controlling Shareholder of PSI General (2005-2012)
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to 9 companies in 2012). On the other side the  widely controlled companies and the 
financial institution controlled companies 
lost their impact on Portuguese listed 
companies between 2005 and 2012, from 4 
to 2, and from 2 to 0, respectively. 
Regarding the State controlled companies, 
don't present  significant observations 
varying since 2005 to 2012 between 1 and 2 
companies. Refer to Table IV and Graphic II. 
 Concerning the CEO/Chairman duality or 
separation of roles, in Portuguese Listed 
Companies we verify that the role 
separation has been increasing its share, 
from representing 33% in 2005 (11 
companies) to 50% in 2012 (19 
companies). On the other hand Role 
Duality has been decreasing its importance 
in the last years (67% to 50%). See Table V 
and Graphic III. 
The results of the econometric models 
tested with Fixed Effects estimator with 
Clustered data are summarized in three 
different tables for each dependent variable. Table VI, VII and VIII report the results for 
the relationship between return on equity (ROE, Model 1), operating performance (ROA, 
Model 2), Tobin’s Q (Model 3) and the governance measures respectively. For each 
Table V - CEO/Chairman Dual Role of PSI General (2005-2012)
Year Total
2005 22 67% 11 33% 33
2006 21 62% 13 38% 34
2007 22 61% 14 39% 36
2008 20 53% 18 47% 38
2009 20 53% 18 47% 38
2010 20 53% 18 47% 38
2011 20 53% 18 47% 38
2012 19 50% 19 50% 38
Total 164 56% 129 44% 293
CEO/Chairman Dual Role of PSI General (2005-2012)
Role Duality Role Separation
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dependent variable it was also estimated the model with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and Fixed Effects, presented in the same tables as of the Clustered models. 
 
Regarding Model 1 we found that the board independence variable was significant with a 
confidence level of 90% (β=0,1108; p-value < 0,1). This means that when we have an 
increase of 1% in Board Independence, ROE will increase 11%. This result agrees to 
hypothesis 2.A, associating higher levels of board independence with performance, which 
goes in line with Bhagat & Bolton (2009), supporting the international guidelines of OECD. 
In this model the most consistent variable is the Directors' Ownership which is significant 
at a 99% confidence level (β=0,0010; p-value < 0,01). Although the coefficient value is 
close to zero (conclusions are not consistent) it is positive which supports hypothesis 5.B, 
meaning that when Directors own company's shares it helps performance and it can be an 
incentive to directors to achieve better result. The remaining corporate governance 
variables don't present significant p-values, as a result, it is not consistent to conclude for 
hypothesis 1, 3, 4 or 6. Despite that, some results should be considered, for Latin Model 
and Family Controlled Companies variables the coefficient is positive, corroborating the 
hypotheses that this two variables have positive effects on ROE.  
Table VI - Model 1 outcomes 
Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
Latin Model -0,0081 0,0249 0,7440 0,0037 0,0355 0,9160 0,0037 0,0444 0,9330
 BoardIndependence 0,0066 0,0449 0,8830 0,1108 0,0638 0,0840 * 0,1108 0,0656 0,1000 *
 CEOChairmanDualRole -0,0033 0,0182 0,8570 -0,0051 0,0335 0,8800 -0,0051 0,0435 0,9080
FamilyControlledCompany 0,0244 0,0195 0,2110 0,0137 0,0418 0,7440 0,0137 0,0909 0,8810
DirectorsOwnership 0,0000 0,0000 0,0010 * 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 *** 0,0010 0,0000 0,0000 ***
 ShareholderConcentration -0,1020 0,0493 0,0400 ** 0,0138 0,0850 0,8710 0,0138 0,0872 0,8750
EconomicPeriod -0,0467 0,0163 0,0050 *** -0,0468 0,0143 0,0010 *** -0,0468 0,0175 0,0110 ***
BookDE -0,0019 0,0011 0,1010 * -0,0030 0,0015 0,0450 ** -0,0030 0,0016 0,0780
NetSales 0,0000 0,0000 0,0010 * 0,0000 0,0000 0,9310 0,0000 0,0000 0,9290
_cons 0,1615 0,0446 0,0000 * 0,0718 0,0753 0,3420 0,0718 0,0814 0,3840
R-squared
Prob > F
***, **, *, are significant at levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.










MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  




On model 2 the only significant variable is the Directors' Ownership at a 99% confidence 
level (β=0,0010; p-value < 0,01). Although the coefficient value is close to zero 
(conclusions are not consistent) it is positive which supports hypothesis 5.B, similar to the 
conclusions taken to the previous analyzed model. The remaining corporate governance 
variables don't present significant p-values, so again it is not consistent to conclude for 
hypothesis 1, 2.A, 3, 4 or 6. Although, once again, the results of the Latin Model and the 
Family Controlled Companies variables can be considered presenting a positive coefficient, 
also corroborating the hypotheses that this two variables have positive effects on ROA. 
 
Finally, considering Model 3 (Tobin's Q as the dependent variable) we found once again 
the same result as for the previous two models regarding the directors ownership 
variable. It is significant at 99% confidence level and the coefficient is positive but close to 
zero and as in the other models the hypothesis 5.A is accepted. On the other hand unlike 
models 1 and 2 CEO/Chairman Dual Role variable is significant at 95% confidence level, 
and presents a positive coefficient (β=0,1228; p-value < 0,05). This means we found that 
Table VII - Model 2 outcomes 
Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
Latin Model -0,0125 0,0065 0,0570 * 0,0065 0,0079 0,4120 0,0065 0,0131 0,6240
 BoardIndependence -0,0014 0,0118 0,9030 0,0189 0,0140 0,1780 0,0189 0,0143 0,1950
 CEOChairmanDualRole -0,0039 0,0048 0,4130 0,0014 0,0074 0,8520 0,0014 0,0077 0,8590
FamilyControlledCompany 0,0055 0,0050 0,2640 0,0029 0,0085 0,7370 0,0029 0,0118 0,8110
DirectorsOwnership 0,0000 0,0000 0,6130 0,0000 0,0000 0,0690 * 0,0010 0,0000 0,0000 ***
 ShareholderConcentration -0,0248 0,0129 0,0560 * 0,0253 0,0197 0,1990 0,0253 0,0271 0,3570
EconomicPeriod -0,0078 0,0043 0,0730 * -0,0070 0,0033 0,0330 ** -0,0070 0,0042 0,1010 *
BookDE 0,0000 0,0001 0,8800 0,0000 0,0001 0,6930 0,0000 0,0001 0,7090
NetSales 0,0000 0,0000 0,1840 0,0000 0,0000 0,2050 0,0000 0,0000 0,1800
_cons 0,0761 0,0117 0,0000 *** 0,0160 0,0169 0,3460 0,0160 0,0263 0,5470
R-squared
Prob > chi2
***, **, *, are significant at levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.






Table VIII - Model 3 outcomes 
Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
Latin Model -0,0450 0,0521 0,3890 -0,0623 0,0670 0,3540 -0,0623 0,0878 0,4830
 BoardIndependence 0,1060 0,0890 0,2350 -0,0393 0,1002 0,6950 -0,0393 0,1438 0,7860
 CEOChairmanDualRole 0,0261 0,0367 0,4770 0,1228 0,0587 0,0380 ** 0,1228 0,0462 0,0120 **
FamilyControlledCompany -0,0360 0,0375 0,3380 0,0019 0,0635 0,9770 0,0019 0,0614 0,9760
DirectorsOwnership 0,0000 0,0000 0,0290 ** 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 *** 0,0010 0,0000 0,0000 ***
 ShareholderConcentration -0,1524 0,1020 0,1360 -0,0242 0,1734 0,8890 -0,0242 0,1538 0,8760
EconomicPeriod -0,1129 0,0325 0,0010 *** -0,1094 0,0248 0,0000 *** -0,1094 0,0321 0,0020 ***
BookDE -0,0009 0,0010 0,3840 0,0000 0,0008 1,0000 0,0000 0,0005 1,0000
NetSales 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 *** 0,0000 0,0000 0,5020 0,0000 0,0000 0,7910
_cons 1,2490 0,0931 0,0000 *** 1,1204 0,1514 0,0000 *** 1,1204 0,1423 0,0000 ***
R-squared
Prob > chi2
***, **, *, are significant at levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.





MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
                                         PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE                                            33 
33 
 
when CEO and chairman are the same person it brings benefits to the company's 
performance, supporting the stewardship theory and contradicting the view of the agency 
theory that defends the separation of CEO  and chairman roles. The results presented 
mean that when we are in the presence of role duality  Tobin's Q increases 0,12, 
contradicting hypothesis 3. The remaining corporate governance variables don't present 
significant p-values, as a result, it is not consistent to conclude for hypothesis 1, 2, 4 or 6. 
Not disregarding this fact, but considering for some results as the Family Controlled 
Companies that again presents a positive coefficient is positive, corroborating the 
hypotheses that it has a positive effect on Tobins'Q. However considering the Latin model, 
opposing to the hypothesis that it presents a positive effect on performance, when 
concluding for Tobin's Q we observe a negative coefficient. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to give an updated overview of the theories of Corporate 
Governance, in an era of global financial scandals around the world, in which Corporate 
Governance has quickly been developing, through the implementation of national and 
international governance codes. As Clarke put it:  
“The environmental context in which business must operate in future suggest the 
following imperatives which all corporations will face, and all corporate governance 
systems will need to resolve: maintaining a license to operate via transparency and 
accountability; generating more value with minimum impact; preserving the natural 
resource base; doing business in a networked, intelligent, multi-stakeholder world.” 
In Clarke (2004), p.35 
Through the understanding of Corporate Governance concepts and theories, and based on 
empirical research, the main conclusions and contributions of this research are 
summarized as following. We start with the observation of Board Independence that in 
average approaches the CMVM recommendation of the 25% representation, with a mean 
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of 22%. With regards to the population under analysis, when we have an increase of 1% in 
Board Independence, ROE will increase 11%, associating higher levels of board 
independence with performance. This result follows Bhagat & Bolton (2009) conclusion, 
and supports the international guidelines of OECD as well as the CMVM recommendation 
of the 25% representation. Considering for CEO and chairman role separation or duality, 
although we verifyed that the role separation has been increasing its share, our results 
show that, when CEO and Chairman are the same person it brings benefits to company's 
performance. This contradicts Yermack (1996) and Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) 
conclusions, supporting the stewardship theory and opposing to the view of the agency 
theory. 
Additionally through the observation of the type of corporate governance model, we can 
concluded that the Latin Model, the historical model in Portugal, has been losing 
observations to the Anglo-Saxon Model, which is in line with the conclusion of  Weimer & 
Pape (1999) of convergence of the corporate governance systems towards the Anglo-
Saxon Model. Regarding the type of controlling shareholder this research corroborates La 
Porta et al. (1999) conclusion that in Europe, despite UK and Ireland where the widely 
held corporations have an important impact, the majority of European corporations is 
controlled by families, since the Family Controlled companies represent the 60% of the 
listed companies in Portugal. 
The interpretation of these results should not disregard the limitations of this research. 
First, as previously mentioned, there are a great variety of Corporate Governance 
theories, so a limitation of this research will lie on the difficulty of reaching a general 
theory of Corporate Governance. This is a very complex subject, since companies match 
both economic and social perspectives. Plus, due to the diversity of cultural backgrounds 
around the world, each nation has its own economic, political and legal frameworks, 
which also lead to the creation of diversified Corporate Governance systems, that are each 
time more widespread and converging between countries. Second, another limitation of 
the research was that for the empirical research emphasis was given solely to publicly 
listed companies, in the representation of the Portuguese companies. This emphasis to 
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publicly listed companies is due to the availability of necessary data, which is only required 
with a high compliance level to publicly listed companies. But of course one limitation of 
the empirical research is that the non-listed companies will be disregarded, that on the 
other hand, certainly present very distinct characteristics from the listed companies. 
Hence, for future research I propose to extend the analysis, consistent with corporate 
governance theories, to other relevant points of discussion, or other determinant 
variables, as for instance the ones pointed in appendix 1, but disregarded for this 
research. Another suggestion is that future researchers should, in order to broaden up the 
sample, include small and medium size companies, since this type of companies present 
very distinctive structures and characteristics, which should be interesting to analyze.  
MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  




Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis. 31 (3). p.pp. 377–397. 
Barber, B. & Lyon, J. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical 
power and specification of test statistics. Journal of financial economics. 43 (3). p.pp. 
341–372. 
Batista, C.D.B. & Farinha, J.B.R.B. (2009). As variáveis determinantes na escolha do modelo 
de corporate governance em Portugal. Universidade do Porto. 
Baysinger, B.D. & Butler, H.N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors : 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization. 1 (1). p.pp. 101–124. 
Berle, A. (1965). The impact of the corporation on classical economic theory. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 65 (1). p.pp. 25–40. 
Berle, A. & Means, G.C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: 
Macmillan. 21 (1). p.pp. 78–79. 
Bhagat, S. & Black, B. (1998). Board independence and long-term firm performance. 
Bhagat, S. & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance. 14 (3). p.pp. 257–273. 
Bhagat, S. & Bolton, B. (2009). Sarbanes-Oxley, Governance and Performance. 
Blair, M.M. (1996). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Ownership for the 
Governance Century. Challenge. 39 (1). p.pp. 62–64. 
Clarke, T. (1998). The stakeholder corporation: A business philosophy for the information 
age. Long Range Planning. 31 (2). p.pp. 182–194. 
Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of Corporate Governance - The philosophical foundations of 
corporate governance. T. Clarke (ed.). London and New York: Routledge-Taylor and 
Fracis Group. 
CMVM. CMVM Corporate Governance Code 2010. (2010). 
Código das Sociedades Comerciais. (2011). 
Commitee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992). Report of the 
Commitee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
                                         PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE                                            37 
37 
 
Core, J., Guay, W. & Rusticus, T. (2006). Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? 
An examination of firm operating performance and investors’ expectations. The 
Journal of Finance. LXI (2). 
Costa, F. & Santos, J. (2011). Corporate Governance: Marcos Históricos e a Actualidade em 
Portugal. 
Daily, C., Dalton, D. & Cannella, A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and 
data. Academy of Management Review. 28 (3). p.pp. 371–382. 
Damodaran, A. (2007). Return on Capital ( ROC ), Return on Invested Capital ( ROIC ) and 
Return on Equity ( ROE ): Measurement and Implications Aswath Damodaran Stern 
School of Business. (July). p.pp. 1–69. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F. & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review. 22 (1). p.pp. 20–47. 
Demsetz, H. & Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Political Economy. 93 (6). p.pp. 1155–1177. 
Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance 
and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management. 16 (1). p.pp. 49–66. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
management review. 14 (1). p.pp. 57–74. 
Faccio, M. & Lang, L. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. 
Journal of financial economics. 65 (3). p.pp. 365–395. 
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political 
Economy. 88 (2). p.pp. 288–307. 
Fama, E.F. & French, K.R. (2002). Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions About 
Dividends and Debt. 
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control Separation of 
Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics. XXVI. p.pp. 1–32. 
Freeman, R. & Reed, D. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective in 
corporate governance. California management review. 25. p.pp. 88–106. 
Gómez, S., Martí, C. & Opazo, M. (2008). The Structural Characteristics of Sport 
Organisations: Differentiation within Elite Spanish Professional Football Clubs. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118 (1). p.pp. 107–156. 
MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
                                         PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE                                            38 
38 
 
Guedri, Z. & Hollandts, X. (2008). Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee 
Ownership on Firm Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 16 
(5). p.pp. 460–474. 
Hermalin, B. & Weisbach, M.M.S. (2001). Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Financial Management. 
20 (April). p.pp. 7–26. 
Hermanlin, B.E. & Weisbach, M.S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management. 20 (4). p.pp. 101–112. 
Hillman, A., Cannella, A.A. & Paetzold, R.L. (2000). The resource dependence role of 
corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of Management Studies. 37 (2). p.pp. 235–255. 
Hsiao, C. (2007). Panel data analysis—advantages and challenges. TEST. 16 (1). p.pp. 1–22. 
Jensen, M.C. (1984). Takeovers: Folklore and science. 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure. SSRN Electronic Journal. 3 (4). p.pp. 305–360. 
Kaplan, R.S. & Norton, D.P. (1992). The Balanced Scorecard – Measures that Drive 
Performance The Balanced Scorecard — Measures. 
Kaplan, S. & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112 (1). p.pp. 
169–215. 
Lawrence, P. & Lorsch, J. (1967). Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. 
Administrative science quarterly. 12 (1). p.pp. 1–47. 
Learmount, S. (2002). Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: 
An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics. 20. p.pp. 293–315. 
Nestor, S. & Thompson, J. (2000). Corporate governance patterns in OECD economies: Is 
convergence under way? In: Corporate governance in Asia: A comparative 
perspective. pp. 1–26. 
Niskanen, J., Kinnunen, J. & Kasanen, E. (1998). European Accounting Review: A note on 
the information content of parent company versus consolidated earnings in Finland. 
The European Accounting Review. 7 (1). p.pp. 31–40. 
NYSE Euronext. Rules for the PSI 20 Index. (2011). 
MAFALDA TIERNO                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
                                         PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES' PERFORMANCE                                            39 
39 
 
NYSE Euronext. Rules for the PSI Geral Index. (2008). 
OECD. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. (1999a). 
OECD. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. (2004b). [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/31
557724.pdf. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization 
and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly. 17 (2). p.pp. 218–228. 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F.L. de & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. 
The Journal of Finance. 54 (2). p.pp. 471–517. 
Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., Journal, T. & Dec, N. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital 
Structure ? Some Evidence from International Data. 50 (5). p.pp. 1421–1460. 
Santos, J.A.N. (2009). “ Corporate governance”: desenvolvimentos recentes ea realidade 
portuguesa. UNIVERSIDADE ABERTA. 
Silva, A., Vitorino, A. & Alves, C. (2006). Livro Branco sobre Corporate Governance em 
Portugal. Instituto Português de Corporate Governance. 
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. [Online]. 
Electronic Classics Series. Available from: 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/wealth-nations.pdf. 
Tobin, J. & Brainard, W.C. (1968). Pitfalls in Financial Model Building. 58 (2). p.pp. 99–122. 
Torres-Reyna, O. (n.d.). Panel Data Analysis Fixed & Random Effects. [Online]. Available 
from: http://dss.princeton.edu/training/Panel101.pdf. 
Weimer, J. & Pape, J. (1999). A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance. Corporate 
Governance. 7 (2). p.pp. 152–166. 
Wooldridge, J. (2003). Introductory econometrics: a modern approach. 5th Editio. Cengage 
Learning. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. 




MAFALDA TIERNO                                                                                  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  





Authors and Articles Summary of the theory Possible determinant variables identified
Economic 
Foundations
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations.
Recognition of the need of multiple shareholders in the firm, and 
recognition of the "corporate governance" problem (the conflict 
between shareholders and managers).
Explainatory Variable: Shareholder Concentration.
Berle, A. & Means, G.C. (1932). The modern corporation and private 
property. 
Berle, A. (1965). The impact of the corporation on classical economic 
theory.
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and 
Control Separation of Ownership and Control.
Jensen, M.C. (1984). Takeovers: Folklore and science. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. 
Academy of management review.
Learmount, S. (2002). Theorizing Corporate Governance: New 
Organizational Alternatives.
Daily, C., Dalton, D. & Cannella, A. (2003). Corporate governance: 
Decades of dialogue and data.
Agency 
Theory
Explainatory Variables: Shareholder Concentration; Director Ownership; 
Pursuit of Shareholder Value (Earnings per Share, Dividends per Share, Payout 
Ratio or Dividend Growth); Board of Directors (Board Size or Non-Executive 
Directors); Special Committees (Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee 
or Nomination Commitee); Board Remuneration (Board Fixed Remuneration, 
Board Variable Remuneration, Pension Schemes Executives, Executive Stock 
Compensation); Market for Corporate Control (Governance Index).
Control Variables: Firm Size; Capital Structure or Debt to Equity Ratio.
Debate on the separation of ownership and control, that lead to the 
new definition of the firm as a nexus of contracts among individual 
factors of production. Identification of the residual claims as the 
profit, after all obligations paid, left to the shareholders. Definition 
of the agency relationship and the respective agency costs. 
Identification of internal and external mechanisms for corporate 
control of the agency costs.
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Authors and Articles Summary of the theory Possible determinant variables identified
Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency 
theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns.
Davis, J., Schoorman, F. & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a 
stewardship theory of management. 
Managerial 
Hegemony
Mace, M. L. (1971). Directors: Myth and reality.
Identification of the inefficacy of Board of Directors, before the day-
to-day knoledge and control of the organization of the Executive 
Directors.
Explainatory Variable: Board of Directors (Board Size or Non-Executive 
Directors).
Freeman, R., & Reed, D. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholders: A 
new perspective in corporate governance.
Blair, M.M. (1996). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate 
Ownership for the Governance Century.
Clarke, T. (1998). The stakeholder corporation: A business 
philosophy for the information age.
Lawrence, P. & Lorsch, J. (1967). Differentiation and integration in 
complex organizations. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of 
directors: The organization and its environment.
Hillman, A., Cannella, A.A. & Paetzold, R.L. (2000). The resource 
dependence role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of 




Lazonick, W. & Sullivan, M.O. (2000). Maximising Shareholder 
Value : A New Ideology for Corporate Governance.
Critique of the purpose of shareholder value, introduced by the 
agency theory. There is proposed that instead of pursuiting the 
shareholder values, the boards of directors should pursue an 
"enlightened shareholder value", by equilibrating the interests of 
shareholders with the interests of other stakeholders.
Explanatory Variables: Pursuit of Shareholder Value (Earnings per Share, 







This theory assigns an important task to the board of directors, that 
it is saw as a link that connects the company to the external forces.
Explainatory Variables: Board of Directors (Board Size or Non-Executive 
Directors); Stakeholder Representatives in the Board of Directors (for example 
Employee Representation).
Explainatory Variables: CEO/Chairman Dual Role; Intrinsic Rewards.
States that if the aim of the corporation is to maximize the total 
wealth created by the company, the managers should be concern 
with all the stakeholders and not only the shareholders.
Explainatory Variables: Pursuit of Shareholder Value (Earnings per Share, 
Dividends per Share, Payout Ratio or Dividend Growth); Stakeholder 
Representatives in the Board of Directors (for example Employee 
Representation).
Contestment of the assumption of a self-interested manager, by 
the assumption of a steward manager, that react to intrinsic rewards 
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Structure of Management and Supervision 
 
1 – The management and supervisory body of the company may be structured according to one of three 
modes: 
a) Board of directors and supervisory board; b) Board of directors, to include an audit committee and a 
statutory auditor; c) Executive board of directors, general and supervisory board and statutory auditor. 
2 – Wherever provision is made by law, instead of the board of directors or executive board of directors, there 
may be just one manager and instead of a supervisory board there may be a sole inspector. 
3 – In companies which are structured according to the mode provided for in item a) of paragraph 1, the 
existence of a statutory auditor who is not a member of the supervisory board is mandatory in cases where 
such a provision is set forth by law. 
4 – In companies which are structured according to the mode provided for in item c) of paragraph 1, the 
existence on the general and supervisory board of a committee for financial matters is mandatory in cases 
where such a provision is set forth by law. 
5 – Companies with a single manager cannot adopt the mode provided for in item b) of paragraph 1. 
6 – The articles of association may be amended at any time to adopt another structure which is permitted 
under the previous paragraphs. 
 
Source: Código das Sociedades Comerciais. (2011). 
This translation of  Código das Sociedades Comerciais, was published by CMVM under the title "Commercial Company Act" and 
with the cover note "This does not dispense with the need to consult the original Portuguese version published in the Official 
Gazette." 
Article 414  
Qualitative Composition 
 
5 – Persons who are not associated with a group of specific interests in the company nor in any circumstance 
which is likely to affect their impartiality when analysing or making decisions, particularly by virtue of: 
a) Their being the holder or acting on behalf of the holder of qualifying holdings equal to or greater than 2% 
of the share capital of the company; 
b) Their having been re-elected for more than two terms of office, on a continuous or interrupted basis; 
 
Source: Código das Sociedades Comerciais. (2011). 
This translation of  Código das Sociedades Comerciais, was published by CMVM under the title "Commercial Company Act" and 
with the cover note "This does not dispense with the need to consult the original Portuguese version published in the Official 
Gazette." 
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Appendix 4 - Corporate Governance Models in Portugal according to Article 278.º of 
Commercial Company Act 
 
- Latin Model (Ordinary System)    
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Year Origin Document Recomendations Added 
1986
Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais
* In Portugal the first legislation concerning corporate 
governance matters, even if not called by the name 
"Corporate Governance", appear in 1986 with the 
introduction of "Código das Sociedades Comerciais", 
that contained the basic rules on corporate management 
and control for all types of corporations.
1999 CMVM
Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies
* Follow the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
without imposing strict and uniform models. It 
mentioned topics such as disclosure of information, 
exercise of voting rights, shareholder representation, 
institutional investors, corporate rules and structure and 
functions of administration boards.
2001 CMVM
Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies 
/CMVM Regulation No 7/2001
* Recomendations on the form of dutties regarding 
information disclosure on Corporate Governance 
pratices.
* Philosophy of comply or explain.
2003 CMVM
Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies 
/CMVM Regulation No 11/2003
* Clarification of the concept of independent director.
2005 CMVM
Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies 
/CMVM Regulation No 10/2005
* Internal supervisory mechanisms.
* Clarification of directors remuneration policies.
2006 IPCG
White Book on Corporate 
Governance
* Code of best practices.
* Summary of legal framework of corporate governance 
in Portugal, by identifying the different legal sources 
that originated the Portuguese codes.
2007 CMVM
Corporate Governance Code / 
CMVM Regulation No 1/2007
*43 recomendation grouped into 3 parts: General 
Meeting of Shareholders, Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board, Information and Auditing.
*Dutties of transparency and information disclosure 
concerning directors.
2010 CMVM
Corporate Governance Code / 
CMVM Regulation No 1/2010
*54 recomendation grouped into 3 parts: General 
Meeting of Shareholders, Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board, Information and Auditing.
* Information disclosure on directors remuneration.
* Independence of the External Statutory Auditor.
2013 IPCG
Corporate Governance Code / 
CMVM Regulation No 1/2010
*First Corporate Governance Code, published under the 
responsibility of IPCG.
*A code of best practices to commercial companies 
based on civil law.
* Application since the 1st  January of 2014.
Appendix 5 - Corporate Governance Legal Framework in Portugal 
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Authors Performance Variables Control Variables
Statistical 
Models
Sample Country(ies) Period Main Results
Results 
Signal
Weimer & Pape (1999)
Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, UK, Canada, and 
Australia); Germanic countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, and Finland); Latin countries 
(France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium); and Japan.
Before 1999
Systems are divided into market-oriented systems (Anglo-Saxon countries) 
and network-oriented systems (Germanic, Latin countries and Japan). In 
conclusion, the trend verified is that changes to both systems have been 
observed so in the long-term both systems seem to be converging.
N/A
Maassen (1999) US; UK; and Netherlands. Before 1999
In conclusion, there is the identification of the trend to the convergence of 
both types of corporate boards.
N/A
Jensen & Meckling (1976) n.d. n.d.
This study stated that a higher board independence (or percentage of board 
outsiders) is expected to represent a better active monitoring of the board 
insiders decisions.
N/A
Baysinger and Butler 
(1985)
Relative financial performance (RFP) - firm's return 
on equity divided by the average return on equity.
Size (Relative Asset Size) OLS 266 firms US 1970 - 1980
In terms of performance effects for RFP, firms with higher percentage of 
independent directors presented higher performance.
+
Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991)
Tobin's Q
R&D Expenses; Advertising Expenses; and Size (log 
of the replacement value of the firm's assets).








Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996)
Tobin's Q
RDA (Firm R&D); ADVA (Firm Advertising); LASSET 





500 firms US 1987
Concluded for the negative impact of the increase of outsiders on the board 
(OBOARD), on the performance of the firms, as Tobin's Q.
-
Yermack (1996) Tobin's Q
Capital Expenditures over Sales; Firm Size (Total 
Capital, Total Assets, and Net Sales); Non-CEO 




500 firms US 1984-1991
It is observed a negative relation of the increase in the percentage of outside 
directors with the performance measure Tobin's Q.
-
Bhagat & Black (1998)
Tobin's Q; ROA; Return on Sales to Assets; 
Operating Margin; Sales per Employee; and Market 
Adjusted Returns.
Log(Sales); and Industry. OLS 934 firms US 1991
Found negative correlation between board independence and long-term firm 
performance.
-
Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001)
n.d. n.d.
Denote that several empirical studies on board composition didn't found 
any relation to corporate performance, but seem to find relation to the 
quality of the board’s decisions.
No 
relation
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009)
ROA; Stock Return; and Tobin's q. All  of them with 
variants of past years performance and industry 
adjustments.
CEO Ownership; Leverage (Debt to Equity Ratio); 
Firm Size (log of total assets); R&D Advertising 





1990 - 2004; 
and 1990 - 
2007.
Observation of contradictory relationships according to the shift between 
years, prior to 2002 and after 2002,  as 2002 representing the year of the 
introduction of SOX. Regarding operating performance (as measured by 
ROA) and board independence, prior to 2002, they found a negative 
relationship, and after 2002, they observed a positive relationship.
- / +
Descriptive analyses to develop a taxonomy of systems of corporate governance, by comparing the four different systems upon 
eight characteristics: the prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, the salient stakeholders able to exert influence on 
managerial decision-making, the importance of stock markets in the national economy, the presence or absence of an external 
market for corporate control, the ownership structure, the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate 
performance, and the time horizon of economic relationships.
Descriptive analyses of one-tier boards and two-tier boards characteristics.
Descriptive analysis of board of directors composition, main functions and their influence on corporate performance.
Type of Corporate 
Governance Model
Board Independence
Development of the new concept of the firm and consequently the agency relationship theory.
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Authors Performance Variables Control Variables
Statistical 
Models
Sample Country(ies) Period Main Results
Results 
Signal
Donaldson & Davis 
(1989, 1991)
ROE; and Gain in Shareholder Wealth. n.d. OLS 337 firms US 1985 - 1987 Higher shareholder returns (in terms of ROE) with CEO Duality. +
 Yermack (1996) Tobin's Q
Capital Expenditures over Sales; Firm Size (Total 
Capital, Total Assets, and Net Sales); Non-CEO 




500 firms US 1984-1991
Observed that firms are more valuable when the CEO and Chairman 
positions are separated.
-
Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson (1997)
cf n.d.
The steward relationship will  tend to diminished the monitoring and 
bonding costs, as well as to improve the long-term performance of the firm.
N/A
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009)
ROA; Stock Return; and Tobin's q. All  of them with 
variants of past years performance and industry 
adjustments.
CEO Ownership; Leverage (Debt to Equity Ratio); 
Firm Size (log of total assets); R&D Advertising 





1990 - 2004; 
and 1990 - 
2007.
Identified negative relation of CEO-Duality with operating performance. 
Regarding the stock market based measures of performance, they didn't 
found any consistent significant relation.
-





27 countries 27 countries 1995
They found that except in economies with very good shareholder protection, 
relatively few of the firms are widely held, rather, most of the firms are 
typically controlled by families or the State. The controlling shareholders 
typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow 
rights.
N/A
Faccio e Lang (2001) n.d. n.d.
Descriptive 
Statistics
5.547 firms 13 European countries 1996 - 1999
Concluded that in the U.K. and Ireland more firms are typically widely held, 
but in the rest of continental Europe the most firms are family controlled.
N/A
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 
(1988)
Tobin's Q
R&D per dollar of assets; Advertising Expenses per 
dollar of assets; Long-term debt per dollar of 
assets; Replacement Cost (dollar value of assets); 
and Industry.
OLS 500 firms US 1980
Concluded that Tobin's Q rises when the board ownership rises up to 5%, 
then it falls when the board ownership keeps rising up to 25%, and finally it 
increases but with a slower rhythm if board ownership rises beyond 25%.
+
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996)
Tobin's Q
RDA (Firm R&D); ADVA (Firm Advertising); LASSET 





500 firms US 1987
Concluded that the increase of inside ownership (POD) was positively 
related with the performance of the firms, measured by Tobin's Q.
+
Yermack (1996) Tobin's Q
Capital Expenditures over Sales; Firm Size (Total 
Capital, Total Assets, and Net Sales); Non-CEO 




500 firms US 1984-1991
Found a positive relationship between "Officer and director ownership (%)" 
and the performance, measured by Tobin's Q.
+
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009)
ROA; Stock Return; and Tobin's q. All  of them with 
variants of past years performance and industry 
adjustments.
CEO Ownership; Leverage (Debt to Equity Ratio); 
Firm Size (log of total assets); R&D Advertising 





1990 - 2004; 
and 1990 - 
2007.
Found a positive relation between Director Ownership and operating 
performance. Regarding the stock market based measures of performance, 
they didn't found any consistent significant relation.
+
Descriptive analysis of a steward manager characteristics, that since he can be trusted, the corporation would benefit if he has 
conceded an extended authority.
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Authors and Articles Summary of the theory Possible determinant variables identified
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations.
Recognition of the need of multiple shareholders in the firm, and 
recognition of the "corporate governance" problem (the conflict 
between shareholders and managers).
Explainatory Variable: Shareholder Concentration.
Berle, A. & Means, G.C. (1932). The modern corporation and private 
property. 
Berle, A. (1965). The impact of the corporation on classical economic 
theory.
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and 
Control Separation of Ownership and Control.
Jensen, M.C. (1984). Takeovers: Folklore and science. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. 
Academy of management review.
Learmount, S. (2002). Theorizing Corporate Governance: New 
Organizational Alternatives.
Daily, C., Dalton, D. & Cannella, A. (2003). Corporate governance: 
Decades of dialogue and data.
Explainatory Variables: Shareholder Concentration; Director Ownership; 
Pursuit of Shareholder Value (Earnings per Share, Dividends per Share, Payout 
Ratio or Dividend Growth); Board of Directors (Board Size or Non-Executive 
Directors); Special Committees (Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee 
or Nomination Commitee); Board Remuneration (Board Fixed Remuneration, 
Board Variable Remuneration, Pension Schemes Executives, Executive Stock 
Compensation); Market for Corporate Control (Governance Index).
Control Variables: Firm Size; Capital Structure or Debt to Equity Ratio.
Debate on the separation of ownership and control, that lead to the 
new definition of the firm as a nexus of contracts among individual 
factors of production. Identification of the residual claims as the 
profit, after all obligations paid, left to the shareholders. Definition 
of the agency relationship and the respective agency costs. 
Identification of internal and external mechanisms for corporate 













Authors Performance Variables Control Variables
Statistical 
Models
Sample Country(ies) Period Main Results
Results 
Signal
Jensen & Meckling (1976) n.d. n.d.
They based  their theory of separation of ownership and control on the 
assumption of the dispersion of capital through multiple 
N/A
Demsetz & Lehn (1985)
Percentages of shares controlled by top 
shareholders
Utility Firm; Financial Firm; Media Firm; Equity; 
Stock Market Return; Return on Equity; Capital 
Expenditures; Advertising Expenditures; R&D 
Expenditures; and Total Assets.
OLS 511 firms US 1976-1980
It is observed that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
measures of profit instability.
-
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996)
Tobin's Q
RDA (Firm R&D); ADVA (Firm Advertising); LASSET 





500 firms US 1987
An active market for corporate control is associated with block 
holders (shareholders with holdings higher than 5% percent), and the 
study concluded for the negative impact of corporate control on firms 
performance.
-
Guedri & Hollandts 
(2008) 
Return on Invested Capital; and Market to 
Book Ratio.
Firm Size; Ownership Concentration; Present 
Government Shareholding; Past Government 




230 firms France 2000 - 2006
Regarding ownership of shareholders with more than 5%, they found a 
negative relation with the Return on Invested Capital, but a positive 




Development of the new concept of the firm and consequently the agency relationship theory.
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Performance Variables Definition Formula
ROE (Return on Equity)
As a financial performance measure, as stated by Damodaran (2007) 
it is focused just on the equity component of the investment, 
relating the earnings left over for equity investors after the debt 
costs have been factored in to the equity invested in the asset.
ROA (Return on Assets)
As an operational performance measure, following Barber & Lyon 
(1997),  Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006) and Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 
2009), it was calculated as operating income after depreciation 
divided by year-end total assets. 
Tobins' Q
As a market based performance measure, derived from q, the 
variable introduced by Tobin & Brainard (1968), as the ratio 
between the market value and replacement value of the same 
physical asset, as a proxy to q, Tobins' Q was measured according to 
Kaplan & Zingales (1997), Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) and 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009).
Corporate Governance Variables Definition Formula
Latin Model
Based on the Article 278.º, of Código das Sociedades Comerciais 
(2011), and following the taxonomy given by Weimer & Pape (1999), 
this dummy variable assumes 1 if the company follows the Latin 
model, and 0 if the company is structured as the Anglo-Saxon 
model.
Board Independence
Defined by Bhagat & Bolton (2009) refers to "the percentage of 
directors who are unaffiliated with the sample firm. This includes 
directors who are neither employees of the firm nor affiliated with 
the firm." Regarding the Portuguese law refer to Article 414.º, n.º 5, 
of Código das Sociedades Comerciais (2011).
CEO/Chairman Dual Role
Defined by Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) as a dummy variable 
"taking the value of 1 if the CEO of the sample firm is also the board 
chair, and 0 otherwise".
Family Controlled Company
Stated by Faccio & Lang (2002), opposite to ownership that is 
measured by cash-flow rights, control is measured by the voting 
rights held by the largest shareholder. According to La Porta et al. 
(1999), to describe control of companies, we should look for 
shareholders who control over 10 percent of the votes. Consistent 
with both studies this dummy variable will assume value of 1 if 
controlled by a family, or 0 otherwise.
Director Ownership
Following Bhagat & Bolton (2009), it represents "the dollar value of 
common stock owned by the median director."
Shareholder Concentration
Consistent with Guedri & Hollandts (2008), refers to "the total 
percentage of stock held by shareholders that owned at least 5 per 
cent of a firm’s stock".
Control Variables Definition Definition
Economic Period
Control for the possible effects of the financial crisis dated to 2008, 
it assumes value 1 if after 2008, and 0 otherwise. 
Sales Control for firm size effects, in terms of year end net sales.
Book Debt to Equity Ratio 
(Leverage)
Control for leverage structure, relative to the proportion of 
shareholders' equity and debt used to finance a company's assets.
     ′  = 
Market value of assets





𝐵𝑉𝐴−𝐵  𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓 𝐴  𝑒𝑡 ;   
𝑀𝑉𝐶𝐸−𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓 𝐶 𝑚𝑚   𝐸𝑞𝑢 𝑡𝑦;  
𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐸−𝐵  𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓 𝐶 𝑚𝑚   𝐸𝑞𝑢 𝑡𝑦;  
𝐷𝐹−𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑥𝑒 .  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟     𝐸𝑞𝑢 𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑂𝐸)  =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼 𝑐 𝑚𝑒 𝑡
𝐵  𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒   𝑓  𝐸𝑞𝑢 𝑡𝑦 𝑡  −1
  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟     𝐴  𝑒𝑡   𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡  𝑔  𝐼 𝑐 𝑚𝑒  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑎𝑡   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐸 𝑑    𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴  𝑒𝑡 
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒:  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡  𝑔 𝐼 𝑐 𝑚𝑒  𝑒𝑓 𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑎𝑡   
= 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶  𝑡  𝑓 𝐺  𝑑  𝑆 𝑙𝑑
− 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙  𝑔, 𝐺𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑎 𝑑 𝐴𝑑𝑚    𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡 𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒  𝑒  
𝐵 𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑒 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑟  𝑓   𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑡   𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑟 
  𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑟  𝑓   𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑟 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 − 𝐶ℎ𝑎 𝑟𝑚𝑎  𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅 𝑙𝑒  
1,  𝑓 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐ℎ𝑎 𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒   𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑓 𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟 ;
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤  𝑒.
  
𝐷 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟  𝑂𝑤 𝑒𝑟 ℎ 𝑝 =
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑓 𝑐 𝑚𝑚    𝑡 𝑐𝑘   𝑤 𝑒𝑑  𝑦 𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟 
  𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑟  𝑓   𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑟 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ 𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶  𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡   
=  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑓 𝑐 𝑚𝑚    𝑡 𝑐𝑘  𝑤 𝑒𝑑  𝑦  ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ 𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟   𝑤   𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎 𝑡 5%
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑧𝑎𝑡   
 
𝐸𝑐   𝑚 𝑐 𝑃𝑒𝑟  𝑑  
1,  𝑓 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 2008;
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤  𝑒.
  
𝐵  𝑘 𝐷𝐸 =
𝐷𝑒 𝑡    𝑘  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢 𝑡𝑦    𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
𝐿𝑎𝑡   𝑀 𝑑𝑒𝑙  
1,  𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐 𝑚𝑝𝑎 𝑦  𝑓 𝑙𝑙 𝑤  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑡   𝑀 𝑑𝑒𝑙
0,  𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐 𝑚𝑝𝑎 𝑦 𝑓 𝑙𝑙 𝑤  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴 𝑔𝑙 − 𝑆𝑎𝑥   𝑀 𝑑𝑒𝑙
  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒  =  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒  −  (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟   +  𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑎 𝑐𝑒  𝑓 𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑  𝑟 𝑚     𝑔 𝑔  𝑑  
+  𝑑  𝑐 𝑢 𝑡  𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑑) 
𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝑙𝑦 𝐶  𝑡𝑟 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐶 𝑚𝑝𝑎 𝑦  
1,  𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐 𝑚𝑝𝑎 𝑦    𝑐  𝑡𝑟 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑  𝑦 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑚 𝑙𝑦
0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤  𝑒
  
Appendix 7 - Model variables definitions 
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Test Null Hypothesis Dist. Prob Dist. Prob Dist. Prob
Test for choosing endogeneity estimator: 
Hausman Test.













Once Prob>chi2 > 0.05, we do not reject H0, and although we 
can assume that the Fixed Effect is not correlated with any of 
the regressors, givin that we are considering microeconomic 
data, the use of Fixed Effects is going to be prefered in order 
to allow for possible correlation between the Fixed Effects 
and the regressor.
Test for choosing between Random Effects 
Model and OLS Model: Breusch-Pagan and 
Lagrange Multiplier Test.
H0: Var(u) = 0;












Prob > chibar2 
=0
Since Prob>chibar2: < 0.05, we reject H0, so we reject the 
hypothesis of using a simple OLS Model.





chi2(50)     
=72,34
Prob > chi2  
=0,021
chi2(50)     
=72,34
Prob > chi2  
=0,021
chi2(50)     
=68,62
Prob > chi2  
=0,0413
Since Prob>chi2: < 0.05, we reject H0, so we reject the 
presence of homoskedasticity.
Test for the existence of autocorrelation: 
Wooldridge Test.
H0: no first-order autocorrelation.
F(  1, 34) = 
16,232
Prob > F = 
0,0003
F(  1, 35) = 
6.239
Prob > F = 
0,0174
F(  1, 36) = 
40,923
Prob > F 
=0,0000




Latin Model, BoardIndependence, CEOChairmanDualRole, FamilyControlledCompany, ShareholderConcentration, EconomicPeriod, BookDE, NetSalesIndependent Variables
Dependent Variable ROE ROA
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REASON FOR EXCLUDING CONSOLIDATING COMPANY
1 ALTRI SGPS ALTRI, SGPS, SA
2 B.COM.PORTUGUES FINANCIAL COMPANY
3 B.ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL COMPANY
4 BANCO BPI FINANCIAL COMPANY
5 BANCO POP.ESPANOL FINANCIAL COMPANY
6 BANCO SANTANDER FINANCIAL COMPANY
7 BANIF SA FINANCIAL COMPANY
8 BENFICA SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
9 BRISA BRISA,SA
10 CIMPOR,SGPS CIMPOR, SGPS, SA
11 COFINA,SGPS COFINA, SGPS, SA
12 COMPTA
COMPTA - EQUIPAMENTOS E SERVIÇOS DE 
INFORMÁTICA, SA
13 CORTICEIRA AMORIM CORTICEIRA AMORIM, SGPS, SA
14 E.SANTO FIN.NOM FINANCIAL COMPANY
15 E.SANTO FINANCIAL FINANCIAL COMPANY / PREFERRED SHARES
16 EDP EDP – ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL, SA
17 EDP RENOVAVEIS EDP RENOVAVEIS, SA
18 ESTORIL SOL N
19 ESTORIL SOL P PREFERRED SHARES
20 F.RAMA F. RAMADA INVESTIMENTOS, SGPS, SA
21 FUT.CLUBE PORTO SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
22 GALP ENERGIA-NOM GALP ENERGIA, SGPS, SA
23 GLINTT
PARAREDE - TECNOLOGIAS DE INFORMAÇÃO, SA / GLINT - 
GLOBAL INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES, SA
24 IBERSOL,SGPS IBERSOL, SGPS, SA
25 IMOB.C GRAO PARA IMOBILIÁRIA CONSTRUTORA GRÃO PARÁ, SA
26 IMPRESA,SGPS IMPRESA, SGPS, SA
27 INAPA-INV.P.GESTAO
28 INAPA-PREF S/ VOTO PREFERRED SHARES
29 J.MARTINS,SGPS JERÓNIMO MARTINS, SGPS, SA
30 LISGRAFICA LISGRÁFICA – IMPRESSÃO E ARTES GRÁFICAS, SA
31 MARTIFER MARTIFER, SGPS, SA
32 MEDIA CAPITAL GRUPO MEDIA CAPITAL, SGPS, SA
33 MOTA ENGIL MOTA ENGIL, SGPS, SA
34 NOVABASE,SGPS NOVABASE, SGPS, SA
35 OREY ANTUNES ESC. SOCIEDADE COMERCIAL OREY ANTUNES, SA
36 P.TELECOM PORTUGAL TELECOM, SGPS, SA
37 PORTUCEL PORTUCEL, SA
38 REDITUS,SGPS REDITUS, SGPS, SA
39 REN REN - REDE ELÉCTRICA, SA
40 S.COSTA
41 S.COSTA-PREF PREFERRED SHARES
42 SAG GEST SAG GEST - SOLUÇÕES AUTOMÓVEIS GLOBAIS, SGPS, SA
43 SEMAPA
SEMAPA - SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTÃO, 
SGPS, SA
44 SONAE SONAE, SGPS, SA
45 SONAE CAPITAL FINANCIAL COMPANY
46 SONAE IND.SGPS SONAE INDÚSTRIA, SGPS, SA
47 SONAECOM,SGPS SONAECOM ,SGPS, SA
48 SPORTING SPORT CLUB PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANY
49 SUMOL+COMPAL SUMOL+COMPAL, SA
50 TEIXEIRA DUARTE TEIXEIRA DUARTE, SA
51 TOYOTA CAETANO TOYOTA CAETANO PORTUGAL, SA
52 VAA VISTA ALEGRE
53 VAA-V.ALEGRE-FUSAO
SHARES FROM THE IMPUGNMENT PROCESS REGARDING 
THE OPERATIONS OF SLIPT AND MERGER
54 ZON MULTIMEDIA
ZON MULTIMÉDIA - SERVIÇOS DE TELECOMUNICAÇÕES E 
MULTIMÉDIA, SGPS, SA
COMPANY LISTING NAME
ESTORIL SOL, SGPS, SA
INAPA – INVESTIMENTOS, PARTICIPAÇÕES E GESTÃO, SA
GRUPO SOARES DA COSTA, SGPS, SA
VAA-VISTA ALEGRE ATLANTIS, SGPS, SA
 
Appendix 9 - Companies excluded from the analysis  
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1 ALTRI, SGPS, SA Latin Model
2 BRISA,SA Latin Model
3 CIMPOR, SGPS, SA Latin Model
4 COFINA, SGPS, SA Latin Model
5 COMPTA - EQUIPAMENTOS E SERVIÇOS DE INFORMÁTICA, SA Latin Model
6 CORTICEIRA AMORIM, SGPS, SA Latin Model
7 EDP – ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL, SA Germanic Model
8 EDP RENOVAVEIS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
9 ESTORIL SOL, SGPS, SA Latin Model
10 F. RAMADA INVESTIMENTOS, SGPS, SA Latin Model
11 GALP ENERGIA, SGPS, SA Latin Model
12 PARAREDE - TECNOLOGIAS DE INFORMAÇÃO, SA / GLINT - GLOBAL INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES, SA Latin Model
13 IBERSOL, SGPS, SA Latin Model
14 IMOBILIÁRIA CONSTRUTORA GRÃO PARÁ, SA Latin Model
15 IMPRESA, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
16 INAPA – INVESTIMENTOS, PARTICIPAÇÕES E GESTÃO, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
17 JERÓNIMO MARTINS, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
18 LISGRÁFICA – IMPRESSÃO E ARTES GRÁFICAS, SA Latin Model
19 MARTIFER, SGPS, SA Latin Model
20 GRUPO MEDIA CAPITAL, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
21 MOTA ENGIL, SGPS, SA Latin Model
22 NOVABASE, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
23 SOCIEDADE COMERCIAL OREY ANTUNES, SA Latin Model
24 PORTUGAL TELECOM, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
25 PORTUCEL, SA Latin Model
26 REDITUS, SGPS, SA Latin Model
27 REN - REDE ELÉCTRICA, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
28 GRUPO SOARES DA COSTA, SGPS, SA Latin Model
29 SAG GEST - SOLUÇÕES AUTOMÓVEIS GLOBAIS, SGPS, SA Latin Model
30 SEMAPA - SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTÃO, SGPS, SA Latin Model
31 SONAE, SGPS, SA Latin Model
32 SONAE INDÚSTRIA, SGPS, SA Latin Model
33 SONAECOM ,SGPS, SA Latin Model
34 SUMOL+COMPAL, SA Latin Model
35 TEIXEIRA DUARTE, SA Latin Model
36 TOYOTA CAETANO PORTUGAL, SA Latin Model
37 VAA-VISTA ALEGRE ATLANTIS, SGPS, SA Latin Model
38 ZON MULTIMÉDIA - SERVIÇOS DE TELECOMUNICAÇÕES E MULTIMÉDIA, SGPS, SA Anglo-Saxon Model
 PSI GERAL COMPANIES BETWEEN 2005 AND 2012
